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The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and Serving the Non-Legal Needs of Clients:
Professional Regulation in a Time of Change
Robert Rubinson*
Introduction
The practice of law is changing. Lawyers who act solely as advocates and
zealous representatives of clients in legal matters still represent the core of what
lawyers do and of how many lawyers see their work, but other trends are filtering
into "on the ground" practice. Increasing numbers of lawyers are mediating, con-
sulting on traditionally non-legal issues, and approaching clients' needs "holisti-
cally" by associating with and integrating other professional services.' These trends
cut across virtually all segments of the profession, from prosecutors and criminal
defense lawyers, to lawyers whose practices involve, among other things, pub-
lic interest work, personal injury, family law, and business law. All indications-
sociological, legal, and economic-suggest that these transformations of what
lawyers do will continue.
The purpose of this Article is to offer a bird's eye view of an evolving profes-
sion, a kind of "Practice 2000" examination of where the profession has been and
where it appears to be going. The goal is not to examine in depth individual move-
ments and practices and the specific ethics issues implicated by each-as noted
below, scholars and practitioners have done this already in many instances 2-but
rather to survey the terrain and note linkages and connections among seemingly
discrete practices performed in widely disparate practice areas. In this regard, a
key thesis of this Article is that these trends interlock and represent shifts in what
it means to be a lawyer.
The Article will approach this topic at a number of levels. It will first address
the traditional notions of practice undergirding the Model Rules of Professional
*Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Education, University of Baltimore School of Law.
I would like to thank the American Bar Association, and especially Arthur Garwin, for commissioning
and supporting the writing of this Article. I am also indebted to Avis Buchanan, Robert Keatinge and
Mark Scurti-my fellow panelists at the ABA National Conference on Professional Responsibility-and
Arthur J. Lachman-a member of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility National Confer-
ence Planning Committee-for sharing their insights and experiences.
1. This differs from the issue of whether lawyers should formally associate with other profes-
sionals in "multidisciplinary practices." For an overview of the MDP debate, see Dennis J. Block
et al., Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.7." Its Origin and Interpretation, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
Ics 739, 764-777 (1992).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
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Conduct and, more generally, how lawyers traditionally conceived what they do.
The Article will next summarize trends that demonstrate how increasing numbers of
lawyers are moving away from this paradigm. Third, while the existing regulatory
framework under which lawyers practice largely retains traditional norms, the seeds
for reconceptualizing the practice of law have been planted in amendments to and
interpretations of the Model Rules. Finally, the Article will explore the degree to
which regulatory changes are necessary to reflect and facilitate these developments.
What Do Lawyers Do-Now And Then
What is "traditional" and "non-traditional" in the practice of law? The Article
will investigate this question by, first, exploring the "traditional" side of the analysis
and then examining non-traditional trends that are filtering through the profession.
1. What is the "Practice of Law"?
Despite numerous attempts, no one has, to everyone's satisfaction, determined
what precisely the practice of law is.3 This is not through lack of trying. The ABA
sought an answer and abandoned the effort.4 Other attempts by courts and legis-
latures have, as noted the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, been at
best "vague and conclusory."5 Perhaps the most accurate consensus is the entirely
unsatisfying and circular notion that the practice of law is what lawyers do.
While the precise definition of the practice of law as a legal matter remains
elusive, what lawyers do in traditional terms is a particularly difficult question:
lawyers advocate on behalf of individual clients. Indeed, the norm is perhaps more
intense: lawyers provide "zealous representation," which captures a sense of tena-
ciousness and single-minded loyalty to clients to the exclusion of all else.
Perhaps the classic example of this understanding was delivered by English
Barrister Lord Brougham in 1820:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of this duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons.., is his first
3. See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
637-638 (2005).
4. Id. at 637. The ABA's final report on the issue may be found at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
model-def/recomm.pdf (last visited April 4, 2008). Representative descriptions of states' attempts
to define the practice of law are as follows: D. Michael Guerin, The World is Flat... And What That
Means to You, 78 Nov. Wis. LAW 2 (2005) (describing challenges in "makling] any headway" on
"what we believe to be the unauthorized practice of law"); Gary G. Sackett, An Analytic Approach
to Defining the "Practice of Law-Utah's New Definition, 18-DEC. UTAH B.J. 12 (2005) (describing
Utah's attempt at defining the "practice of law" and it's "difficult"; the effort involved "carve-outs"
for "'activities that may be the practice of law, but which will not be considered unauthorized practice
when engaged in by non-lawyers"); Melinda J. Bentley, New Consumer Remedies for UPL, 95 ILL.
B.J. 632, 633 (2007) (noting that defining the practice of law has been a "struggle" and that it "defies
mechanistic formulations").
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c (2000).
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and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm,
the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.6
This quote is a point of departure for numerous discussions of lawyers' duties to
clients,' and while many have disagreed with how Brougham envisions an attorney-
client relationship, the continuing centrality of his vision of practice confirms how
foundational it remains.'
Nevertheless, even in Brougham's time his perspective was not universally
accepted, which is perhaps why he deemed it necessary to make the statement in
the first place. In one oft-cited example, Abraham Lincoln offered words of advice
to lawyers: "Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise when-
ever you can. As a peacemaker the lawyer has superior opportunity of being a good
man. There will still be business enough."9 Even earlier, Alexis de Tocqueville, in
an oft-quoted observation during his travels in 1820's America, noted "[lawyers]
serve as arbiters between the citizens.""l Yet another famous example is the notion
of "lawyer for the situation" attributed to Louis Brandeis, the essence of which
rejects slavish adherence to the interests of one client, and rather suggests that
lawyers should facilitate common goals among multiple parties.1 '
2. The "Practice of Law": A Twenty-First
Century Perspective
Brougham's conception remains dominant in popular culture and among
many in the practicing bar, yet practitioners are increasingly adhering to profes-
sional norms that Brougham would not appreciate. The following four examples
offer a flavor of the related trends described in the Introduction. While these sum-
maries are necessarily brief, they are "on the ground" examples of what lawyers
are actually doing in practice and, indeed, might be familiar to many practicing
lawyers in their general outlook, if not in their particulars.
The Article presents these trends from the more easily definable, such as the
increasing role of lawyers as mediators, to the more conceptual, such as lawyering for
the "whole person." The boundaries among these practices blur, yet this structure
6. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETHICS 71 (3rd ed. 2004).
7. Joseph A. Colquitt, Evidence and Ethics, Litigating in the Shadow of the Rules, 76 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1641, 1666 (2007) (noting that a "wealth of scholarly discussion" begins with Brougham).
8. Anecdotally the quote remains compelling to many law students as a fair statement of the
core role of a lawyer as "zealous representative."
9. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 329 (Philip V.D. Stem,
ed., 1940).
10. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70
TENN. L. REV. 63, 72 (2002) (quoting ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 243 (J.P.
Mayer & Max Lemer eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966).
11. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconceptualizing Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105
YALE L.J. 1445, 1502-1511 (1996). Spillenger argues that the phrase "lawyer for the situation" has
multiple meanings, some of which are not as focused on lawyer as problem solver as subsequent
commentators would like to believe, id., but Brandeis' notion of not always acting in the exclusive
interest of a client remains a plausible interpretation.
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will hopefully add coherence to the descriptions. The descriptions also include
specific examples from practice.
The Mediation Boom
It is well known that alternative dispute resolution generally and mediation in
particular is on the rise. Lawyers are more and more acting as mediators. 2 As the
Ethics 2000 Reporter herself noted in commentary on Rule 2.4,'1 while "[the] role
of third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers.., lawyers are increasingly serving
in these roles." 4 This is, perhaps, the surest and most pervasive demonstration that
lawyers are acting in capacities that are distinct from traditional notions of the
practice of law.
The literature about mediation and lawyers' involvement in it is vast and well
beyond the scope of this Article. 5 Nevertheless, two points are worth noting. First,
while what mediation is remains contested, 6 in its most pervasive "facilitative"
style" mediation is utterly unlike the norms of litigation in a multitude of ways:
it is a voluntary process, its goal is often to promote recognition of competing
perspectives, its focus is often the future and not "finding facts" about past events
in order to establish liability, it embraces openness in dialogue and not narrowing
"relevant facts," and it even has private meetings with mediators-something that
would constitute impermissible exparte communications if with a judge.'8 A sec-
ond and related point is that mediation is practiced by many different professionals,
many of whom view lawyers as particularly unsuited to act as mediators because,
12. It is important to note how this section is exploring lawyers acting as mediators, not law-
yers acting as advocates in mediation. The latter also raises issues about lawyers' roles and ethical
rules, but while these are important issues in and of themselves and increasingly attracting scrutiny,
these issues are distinct from the broader scope of this article. Loretta W. Moore, Lawyer Mediators:
Meeting the Ethical Challenges, 30 FAM. L. Q. 679 (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers'Representa-
tion of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy, 14 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 269 (1999). For a recent ethics opinion on the issue, see ABA Formal Opinion
06-439 (2006) ("Lawyer's Obligation of Truthfulness When Representing a Client in Negotiation:
Application to Caucused Mediation").
13. For a more detailed discussion of Rule 2.4 and related amendments, see infra notes 60-65.
14. ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, REPORT
TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF DELEGATES, February 2002, Reporter's Explanation
of Changes to Rule 2.4.
15. One survey of the literature may be found in Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Media-
tion, and Alternative Narratives of Dispute Resolution, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 833 (2004).
16. KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 26 (3rd Ed. 2000).
17. The mediation literature on "styles" of mediation, particularly the differences between
"facilitative," "evaluative," and "transformative," is immense. For two overviews of the debate, see
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts among Dis-
pute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1887 (1997); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus
Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (1997).
18. These and other differences are explored at greater length in Rubinson, supra note 16, at
846-58 (2004).
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in the words of one commentator, "lawyers' adversarial methods and mindsets are
inherently inconsistent with mediation."19
Given these points, while there is some dispute as to whether being a mediator
is "the practice of law,"2 this semantic issue-an issue that leads directly to stan-
dard MDP debates-is largely beside the point. Lawyers are, in the words of the
Preamble, "helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other matter." And the very
title of an ABA Journal article on the subject speaks volumes: "The Lawyer Turns
Peacemaker: With Mediation Emerging as the Most Popular Form of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, The Quest for Common Ground Could Force Attorneys To
Reinterpret Everything They Do in the Future."21 While the practice of mediation
varies, lawyers are plainly involved with a facilitative process that diverges in pro-
found ways from the norms of advocacy and litigation.
Collaborative Law
A fascinating and novel development has been the rise of "collaborative law."
Collaborative law is of very recent vintage: it was developed in 1990 by a Min-
neapolis family law attorney named Stuart Webb.22 Nevertheless, its growth has
been described as "exponential," with collaborative lawyers practicing in "virtu-
ally every state and province in the United States and Canada."2 3 This practice
arose and continues to be centered in family law, where the adversarial process is
widely viewed as intensifying family conflict to the detriment of divorcing spouses
and, in particular, children. Nevertheless, collaborative law principles have arisen
elsewhere, including medical malpractice cases.24
Collaborative law is, at bottom, an attempt to reject adversarial norms in favor
of openness and a free sharing of information.25 It is often conceived of as refer-
ring to two related but distinct practices: an original conception, in which clients
formally retain only lawyers, and a fully interdisciplinary conception-often re-
ferred to as "cooperative law"-in which clients hire a group of professionals in
addition to attorneys. 26 Both conceptions recognize the many intertwined aspects
of matters, from the financial to the emotional, and thus a central tenet of the move-
ment is involvement of other professionals in the process.
27
19. Sternlight, supra note 12, at 269.
20. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10, at 90.
21. Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker: With Mediation Emerging as the Most
Popular Form of Alternative Dispute Resolution, The Quest for Common Ground Could Force At-
torneys To Reinterpret Everything They Do in the Future, 82 A.B.A. J. 54 (1996).
22. William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice,
4 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 351, 354-55 (2004).
23. Gary L. Voegele, et al, Collaborative Law: A Useful Tool for the Family Law Practitioner
to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 971, 975 (2007).
24. Kathleen Clark, The Use of Collaborative Law in Medical Error Situations, 19 No. 6
HEALTH LAW. 19 (2007).
25. See Gary L. Voegele, supra note 23; Schwab, supra note 22.
26. Voegele, supra note 23, at 976-77.
27. Id. at 986.
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There are a number of generally accepted characteristics of either collabora-
tive or cooperative law. They have voluntary and transparent discovery, meetings
among parties, counsel and, often, other appropriate parties such as financial plan-
ners and child psychologists, an orientation that rejects litigation as an effective
option, a requirement that all attorneys involved in a matter adhere to the norms of
collaborative law, and, most controversially, a retainer agreement that provides for
termination of representation should the parties choose to litigate.28
The role of a collaborative lawyer differs from the role of lawyers as media-
tors. In mediation, lawyers undertake a distinct, non-representational role. Collab-
orative law involves non-adversarial and problem-solving approaches to practice.
Nevertheless, collaborative law has much in common with mediation because both
reject adversarial norms. Other examples follow.
Lawyering for the "Whole Person"
Some practitioners are increasingly extending their role beyond providing
narrowly tailored legal expertise: they provide services to the "whole person." This
perspective is sometimes called "holistic advocacy ' 29 but whatever its name, this
notion is spreading through a remarkably diverse cross-section of the profession.
One prominent example is defending indigent criminal defendants. As one
commentator has put it, "'holistic representation' ... strives to encompass the vari-
ous underlying issues that often lead to clients' experiences with the criminal jus-
tice system, with the aim of addressing those circumstances and preventing future
criminal involvement."3 This represents "a paradigmatic shift in defense philoso-
phy" and "has transformed criminal defense practice by broadening the conception
of what defense lawyers actually do."'" An influential organization that practices
holistic advocacy in indigent criminal defense work is The Bronx Defenders, which
describes its philosophy as follows:
The Bronx Defenders views clients not as "cases," but as whole people ....
Our staff of attorneys, social workers, investigators, administrative sup-
port, and community organizers is committed to working with our clients,
their families, and their communities to address the critical issues that
circumscribe their lives. Whether defending a client's liberty; connecting
28. For a detailed overview of these characteristics of collaborative law, see Voegele, supra
note 23, at 978-86.
29. While this term connotes a relatively specific set of practices in the academic literature,
I use the term more broadly to encompass trends in which practitioners focus on the "whole client"
or "situation" beyond traditional notions of zealous representation of the individual. Virtually all of
the sources upon which I rely in the text are from practitioners and practitioner-oriented publications.
30. Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences
and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1067 (2004). See also Erik
Luna, Punishment Theorn, Holism and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH
L. REV. 205, 283 (2003); David E. Rovella, The Best Defense... Rebuilding Clients' Lives to Keep
Them From Coming Back, NAT'L L. J. Jan. 31, 2000, at Al (describing indigent criminal defense
attorneys who practice holistic advocacy).
31. Pinard, supra note 30, at 1068.
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her to mental health services for the first time; encouraging individuals
to engage in the civic life of their community; or preparing neighborhood
youth to be the next generation of leaders, The Bronx Defenders ulti-
mately strives to improve the lives and futures of the Bronx community
as a whole. 2
These practices and conceptions have influenced the larger public defender com-
munity in terms of how it approaches its clients and its work.33
This conception extends beyond the criminal defense bar. A Michigan per-
sonal injury firm describes itself in terms strikingly similar to those of The Bronx
Defenders:
[W]e do not handle "cases" but rather we represent people. We believe
that in addition to money, clients have other needs which must be met to
permit them back into their lives .... [We] help our clients identify and
obtain help for those other needs: medical, reconstructive, psychological,
occupational, and personal.... [W]e form friendships with many clients
that last a lifetime.
34
A Georgia elder law practitioner has a practice that encompasses "geriatric care
management"35 and, among other goals, works to "minimize[] confusion and feel-
ings of being overwhelmed while managing the care of a loved one."36 Other ex-
amples that are closely related are described below.
"Lawyers for the Situation"
Another development moves its emphasis away from a lawyer's traditional
focus on zealousness on behalf of individual clients into collaborations that recall
32. http://www.bronxdefenders.org/ (last visited February 20, 2008).
33. Interview with Avis E. Buchanan, Director, Public Defender Office for the District of Co-
lumbia (February 27, 2008). One prominent example is the Georgia Justice Project, which describes
itself as follows: "We are an unlikely mix of lawyers, social workers, and a landscaping company.
We defend people accused of crimes and, win or lose, we stand with our clients as they rebuild their
lives. We believe this is the only way to break the cycle of crime and poverty." http://www.gjp.org/
(last visited February 27, 2008). Another example is The Neighborhood Defender Service of Har-
lem, which provides criminal defendants with a "team defense" that "'combines the tools of law and
social work to provide the best services possible for our clients." http://www.ndsny.org/mission.htm
(last visited February 27, 2008). For a brief overview of holistic practices in public defender work,
see Robin G. Steinberg, Beyond Lawyering: How Holistic Representation Makes for Good Policy,
Better Lawyers, and More Satisfied Clients, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 625 (2006). See also
Melissa Rothstein, Reaching through Prison Walls: Social Work in an Appellate Defender Office,
30 Apr. CHAMPION 30 (2006).
34. The firm is Halpert, Weston, Wuori & Sawusch. See http://www.hwwspc.com/about.
shtml (last visited February 20, 2008); Steven Keeva, The Nicest Tough Firm Around, 85 A.B.A.J.
60(1999).
35. The attorney is Victoria L. Collier, http://www.elderlawga.com/profile.html (last visited
February 20, 2008). See Victoria L. Collier, Thinking of Hiring a Geriatric Care Manager? Integrat-
ing Geriatric Care Management into Your Law Practice, 200 ELDER LAW ADVISORY 1 (2007).
36. http://www.elderlawga.com/ (last visited February 21, 2008).
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Lincoln's "neighbors" and Brandeis' "situations." This is radical indeed. It sub-
verts the zealous representation model epitomized by Brougham, the essence of
which is that lawyers zealously represent a single client.37
A representative example is retold in the New York State Bar Journal. 38 A
litigator "at a traditional corporate law firm in Maryland" represented a "company
that became aware of pollution problems at one of its facilities." The lawyer ini-
tially advised his client to "avoid[] communication with the media and its neigh-
bors out of fear that disclosing past problems might lead to litigation," advice that
the company followed for a number of years and advice with which most corporate
litigators would agree. Then, upon reading a book about "seeing law differently,"39
his advice and outlook changed at a community meeting:
[H]e apologized to the community for having advised his client to main-
tain a low profile. Instead, he and his environmental consultant disclosed
precisely what had been done to remediate the problem and invited the
community to participate in plant tours .... The community's concern and
anger were dissipated by this cathartic event.., and the relationship between
the company and the community was significantly improved.... Compas-
sion, information sharing, cooperation and understanding on both sides
encouraged community and commonality of purposes. There was no call
for blame and no need for the waste of resources in litigation.40
While this lawyer was representing his company, his actions call into question
conventional notions of "adversaries," or, needless to say, Brougham's call to dis-
regard "the alarm, the torments, the destruction" a lawyer "may bring upon others."
This attorney viewed alarm, torments, and destruction as precisely the wrong type
of advocacy.
Another fascinating development in this arena is the rise of public interest
"community lawyering." Community lawyering is an evolving practice that often
entails working with a range of non-profit organizations and activists. Goals can
vary, ranging from facilitating housing in low-income communities, assisting com-
munity entrepreneurs in attracting capital, associating with community organiza-
tions to identify service community needs, such as child-care facilities, banks, and
youth centers, and engaging in lobbying and political action.4 A crucial dimension
of this practice is that lawyers do not represent a client per se or presuppose a legal
37. See text accompanying notes 6-8.
38. Robert P. Borsody, A New Paradigm for Lawyers?, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 54 (2002). The attorney
is Thomas Lynch, a partner at the Maryland firm of Miles & Stockbridge.
39. ALAN REID, SEEING LAW DIFFERENTLY: VIEWS FROM A SPIRITUAL PATH (1992).
40. Borsody, supra note 38, at 54-55.
41. For an overview of practices and conceptions of community lawyering, see Scott L. Cum-
mings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement
for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY EcO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001); Michael
Diamond, Communitv Law'vering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
67 (2000).
126
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION IN A TIME OF CHANGE
goal but play one role, indeed a subsidiary role, in the much broader enterprise of
enhancing opportunity and economic well-being in impoverished communities.42
Commonalities
These trends have common themes: moving away from a narrow sense of
"zealous advocacy" on behalf of individual clients; rejecting an adversarial para-
digm as the sole or even primary role attorneys should undertake; approaching law
practice as an enterprise that must take account of and embrace the many "non-
legal" dimensions of client representation. Moreover, other practices under other
names resonate closely with these trends, such as consensus building,"43 therapeutic
jurisprudence,' preventive law, 45 among others. There are also no doubt other law-
yers who might not identify themselves as "holistic" or "collaborative" or moving
beyond the "paradigms of practice," yet they likely will still recognize themselves
as embodying these larger trends.
Regulation of The Legal Profession:
Tradition and Seeds of Change
The Model Rules, with modest exceptions, retain the traditional view of law
practice. The introductory paragraphs of the Rules' Preamble represent the norms
of practice from which the Rules themselves emerge:
[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of cli-
ents, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special respon-
sibility for the quality of justice.
[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As
advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the
client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications.
As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules
42. See MARTHA R. MAHONEY ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND
LAW (2003). For a particularly compelling account of the complexities of such practice, albeit in a
comparative context, see Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyer-
ing and Power, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 699 (1988).
43. Consensus building "involve[s] multiple and complex issues with more than two parties,
[and] are hybrids of negotiation, case presentation, and often, legislation and rule-drafting." Menkel-
Meadow, supra, note 10, at 75.
44. See ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds.
1991). Therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to examine "legal arrangements with therapeutic outcomes."
Id. at 8. Interestingly, two commentators have drawn connections between therapeutic jurisprudence
and mediation. Gary Paquin & Linda Harvey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Transformative Mediation
and Narrative Mediation: A Natural Connection, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 167 (2002). Comment [4] to
Rule 2.9 of the recently revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes "therapeutic... courts"-
a demonstration of how the idea is spreading.
45. ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, PREVENTIVE LAW: MATERIAL ON A NON ADVERSARIAL LEGAL
PROCESS xl (1997) (preventive lawyering views litigation "as a kind of failure, representing an unfor-
tunate breakdown in the system in which parties or lawyers failed to anticipate possible conflict and
take preventive measures").
JOURNAL OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER
of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous
to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others.
As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client's legal affairs and report-
ing about them to the client or to others.46
Although certainly not as radical as Brougham, there is nothing here with which
Brougham would disagree.47 That said, change is in the air not only "on the ground"
but at the formal level of amendments to and interpretations of the Model Rules.
The following offers examples in chronological order that resonate to varying de-
grees with broad conceptions of non-traditional lawyering.
1. Rule 2.1: Lawyers as Counselors about... "Moral,
Economic, Social and Political Factors"
Rule 2.1 is a call for lawyers to "exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice."4 8 It also, however, extends into territory that seems only tan-
gentially related to "independent professional judgment"4 9 by focusing on the nature
of the advice itself: "In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations, such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may
be relevant to the client's situation." Comments [2] and [4] elaborate as follows:
Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a
client .... Purely technical legal advice.., can sometimes be inadequate.
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may be in the domain of
another profession.
The language goes on to identify such professions as "psychiatry, clinical psychol-
ogy or social work" for family law matters and "the accounting profession" and
"financial specialists" for business matters.50
While rejecting the value in most instances of "advice couched in narrow legal
terms," Rule 2.1 is not clear about what the converse-"broad legal terms"-might
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (2004).
47. To be sure, there are some statements in the Model Rules that would give Brougham, per-
haps, some pause. The most likely would be Comment [1] to Rule 1.3 which, after noting that a law-
yer "'must ... Act ... with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf," acknowledges that a "lawyer is
not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client" and that a lawyer
is not "'require[d] [to] use offensive tactics or preclude[d] from... Treating... all persons involved in
the legal process with courtesy and respect." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [1]. In
addition, as of 2005, ten states have omitted "zeal" from their Rules, although most continue to retain it.
Arthur J. Lachman & Peter R. Jarvis, Zeal in Client Representation-FAQs, PROF. LAW., 2005 SYMPo-
SIUM ISSUE, 81, 83-84. Nevertheless, zeal remains a traditional cornerstone of the Model Rules' and
professionals' conception of advocacy. See id.
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1
49. Interestingly, the source of Rule 2.1 is the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
Canon 5-"A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client."
The Canon, and its succeeding Ethical Considerations, primarily address conflicts of interest and do
not mention the nature of the advice.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 4.
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mean. One implication seems to be that valuable and legitimate legal "advice" is
embedded with other things that are plainly outside the traditional expertise of
lawyers. A somewhat inconsistent interpretation, however, is that matters "beyond
strictly legal questions" are not for lawyers but for other professionals.
In the end, Rule 2.1 is significant in the context of this Article for two reasons.
First, it recognizes that the practice of law is not only about law and that "narrow
legal advice" usually is an inadequate means to represent clients. Second, it legiti-
mates the value of associating with other professionals to enhance the quality of
services a lawyer provides.51
2. Rule 5.7: The Distinction Between "Law-Related"
and Legal Services
Rule 5.7-entitled "Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services"-was
adopted in largely its present form by the American Bar Association in 1994.52
The primary impetus behind this Rule was the rise of businesses in which law-
yers owned interests and the ethical difficulties arising from these developments.53
Commentators noted that such services better served the needs of clients, although
others noted that such "ancillary services" also were highly profitable. 54 A Com-
ment to the Rule itself only mentions the former,55 although commentators critical
of the trend cited "greed" as the primary motivation.56
51. These principles have also long been associated with David A. Binder and Paul Berg-
man's influential text on "client centered lawyering" and subsequent books by them with addi-
tional co-authors. DAVID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); DAVID A. BINDER, ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2D ED. 2004) ("Lawyers as Counselors"). For example, Binder and
his co-authors note that "[a]ctively encouraging clients to talk about non-legal consequences is often
necessary" in the counseling process. Lawyers as Counselors, at 9. They also note how in the context
of commercial transactions "the lines between the 'legal' and 'non-legal' aspects of business deals
tend to blur," id. at 212, and they devote an entire chapter to "referring clients to mental health profes-
sionals." Id. at 445-55.
52. Prior to 1994, a version of Rule 5.7, entitled "Provision of Ancillary Services," was adopted
in 1991 and then was rescinded the following year. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005, 640-52 (2005). Relatively modest
changes to Rule 5.7 were adopted through the Ethics 2000 process. http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/
e2k-57_202.html (last visited February 28, 2008). For a detailed and excellent review of the history
and debate surrounding the ancillary business phenomenon, see Block, supra note 1, at 743-44.
53. A primary concern is whether such businesses would run afoul of fee splitting prohibi-
tions. See Loretta W. Moore, Lawyer Mediators: Meeting the Ethical Challenges, 30 FAM. L. Q. 679,
682-83 (1996). For an interesting example of one state grappling with this issue, see Maryland State
Bar Association Ethics Comm. on Ethics, Op. 03-02 (2003) (given that Maryland law defines court-
connected "mediation" as not the practice of law, lawyers can create businesses with non-lawyer
mediators so long as their practice is limited to court-connected mediation).
54. Block, supra note 1, at 752-54.
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. [9] ("[a] broad range of economic
and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related
services").
56. Block, supra note 1, at 757.
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The Rule itself explains when the Rules of Professional Conduct should apply
when lawyers provide law-related services. The Rule, in Comment [9], offers ex-
amples of law-related services: "providing title insurance, financial planning, ac-
counting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic
analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medi-
cal or environmental consulting."
The Rule's conception of law-related services is instructive because it com-
prises a vast array of activities, with the implicit recognition that all of these ser-
vices are, at a minimum, "law-related." This is very much in the spirit of Rule 2.1.
Nevertheless, the Rule seems to walk an exquisitely fine line on whether "law-
related" services are so "related" as to be indistinguishable from legal services.
On the one hand, the Rule defines "law-related services" as "not prohibited as un-
authorized practice of law,'" '57 which suggests that they are not the practice of law.
On the other hand, a Comment to the Rule notes that such services can be provided
"under circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal ser-
vices to clients."58 This second point no doubt contemplates that "circumstances"
include how attorneys present these services to clients and perhaps even the lack of
physical separation between who provides them, yet confusion could only be pos-
sible (or perhaps likely) when there are exceptionally close connections between
what is "law-related" and what is "law" itself.
Debates leading up to the adoption of Rule 5.7 reflect these decidedly mixed
messages. James W. Jones, then at Arnold & Porter, a firm which had created ancil-
lary businesses, 59 noted the following in 1988:
[T]he time has come for lawyers to ask themselves the question. 'What
business are we in?' As the year 2000 approaches, the answer to this
question may no longer be a simple one for many lawyers and the firms
in which they work. Many lawyers today might find that traditional defi-
nitions of 'lawyering' no longer fit either their own activities or the de-
mands that their clients place upon them .... [T]he range of client services
and the roles often played by the firm's attorneys in client affairs might
lead the attorneys to visualize themselves more accurately as 'profes-
sional problem solvers'... 60
This view was hotly contested at the time and would continue to be so. Other com-
mentators predicted that such thinking would effectively eliminate the practice of
law as a distinct enterprise, accelerate a general decline in professionalism, and
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7(B).
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. [3].
59. Block, supra note 1, at 755.
60. James W. Jones, The Challenge of Change: The Practice of Law in the Year 2000, 41
VAND. L. REV. 683, 689 (1988). The quote is cited and placed in a broader context in Block, supra
note 1, at 755.
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subvert the traditional role that lawyers have as protectors of justice and individual
rights.61
3. Ethics 2000 and the "Third Party
Neutral Amendments"
The Ethics 2000 process and the amendments it generated62 addressed the rise
of ADR and lawyers acting as "third party neutrals." The following are the "Ethics
2000 Third-Party Neutral Amendments":
6 3
• The Preamble to the Model Rules itself mentions specifically that "a lawyer
may serve as a third-party neutral, a nonrepresentational role helping the
parties to resolve a dispute or other matter."64 This is novel to the Model
Rules65 and significant as a general statement: the new wording views a "non-
representational role" as something that lawyers do, although the words
seem to stop short of defining this role as the practice of law per se.
• Prior to Ethics 2000, Rule 1.12 governed conflicts of interest involving
a "former judge or arbitrator." Rule 1.12, as amended, adds "mediator or
other third-party neutral" to the title, and the subsequent text of the rule, for
the most part, folds in "mediator or other third-party neutral" as well as a
"judge" or "arbitrator" into its provisions.66
" Ethics 2000 added an entirely new Rule-Rule 2.4-which is consistent
with the "non-representational" amendments included in the Preamble.
Rule 2.4(a), like the Preamble, embodies an important amplification of the
"non-representational" role referenced in the Preamble: "Service as a third-
party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other
capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter"
(emphasis added). This seems, incrementally, to move into the notion that
61. Block collects these and other criticisms. Id. at 756-57.
62. For sources on the Ethics 2000 process and the amendments that resulted from it, see
ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Commission, Report on the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-report-home.html (last visited Febru-
ary 25, 2008) ("Ethics 2000 Report"); ABA, Summary of House of Delegates Action on Ethics 2000
Commission Report, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-summary-2002.html (last visited Febru-
ary 25, 2008).
63. For a somewhat more detailed discussion of these amendments, see Menkel-Meadow, su-
pra note 10, at 84-87.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble, Paragraph [3].
65. Ethics 2000 deleted Rule 2.2 which, while referring to lawyers acting as "intermediar-
ies," contemplated lawyers undertaking common representation, that is, representing multiple clients
and conflicts that might arise as a result. The text of the deleted Rule 2.2 is available in the Ethics
2000 Commission Report, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-rule22.html (last visited February 25,
2008).
66. For a redlined version of the prior and Ethics 2000 version of Rule 1.12, see Ethics 2000
Commission Report, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-112_202.html (last visited February 25,
2008).
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the lawyer qua lawyer acts as a third-party neutral, although, once again,
this is implicit in the language.
Comment [5] to Rule 2.1 states that "when a matter is likely to involve liti-
gation, it may be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of
dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation."
This amendment generated and continues to generate a lively debate about
whether it should mandate counseling about the availability of ADR67 : its
"may be necessary" language is a remarkable melding of the mandatory and
the discretionary. Nevertheless, this new Rule demonstrates a movement
toward recognizing that engaging in non-adversarial processes is a subject
about which lawyers should counsel clients.
These amendments collectively represent an incremental recognition in the
Model Rules that the traditional paradigm of zealous, individual advocacy does
not fully address what lawyers are doing. The implications of these amendments is
that lawyers can and do play a "non-representational" role-something of an oxy-
moron under conventional notions of practice. These amendments-particularly
Rule 2.4-also represent something perhaps less obvious butjust as important: such
nontraditional practices are still subject to regulation under the ethical rules. There
is thus both a recognition that lawyers increasingly see themselves in new ways and
that these new ways-although unconventional under traditional norms-can and
should be regulated.
4. The ABA and Collaborative Law
A recent ABA Ethics Committee Opinion found collaborative law practice
can be undertaken in accordance with ethical rules.68 As with the Ethics 2000
Third-Party Neutral Amendments, this Opinion is interesting not only for the spe-
cific question it answers-whether a collaborative practice is ethical-but also for
how it analyzes one type of non-traditional practice under Rules that are, as noted
above, traditional in character.
The Opinion confronted the most controversial aspect of collaborative law:
given that the process contemplates a "contractual obligation to withdraw" if it
fails, a collaborative lawyer's services cannot extend to subsequent litigation.69
The Opinion views an agreement between a client and a collaborative lawyer as
"a limited scope representation" permissible under Rule 1.2(c),70 which provides
that "a lawyer may limit the scope of representation if the limitation is reasonable
under the circumstances."
67. Andrew Schepard, Kramer vs. Kramer Revisited: A Comment on the Miller Commission
Report and the Obligation of Divorce Lawyers for Parents to Discuss Alternative Dispute Resolution
with Their Clients, 27 PACE L. REv. 677 (2007).
68. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447 (2007). Other state
bar associations reached the same conclusion with only one exception. Id. at 2.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id. at 4.
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The Opinion rejects an argument that this arrangement renders it impossible
for a lawyer to provide "competent and diligent representation" and thus creates
a non-consentable conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(b)(1). 71 To the contrary, the
Opinion found that the client has merely agreed to limit her lawyer's role and may
pursue all avenues, including litigation, if succeeding events warrant it. There is
irony here, though, given that collaborative lawyering is inherently inconsistent
with the Model Rules, at least in the sense that its practices wildly veer from norms
embodied in the Rules. This is not to say that the Opinion's reasoning is wrong:
to the contrary, in terms of its analysis, it seems entirely correct. Rather, it appears
that the premises underlying the Model Rules do not, in and of themselves, fore-
close non-traditional practices; the Model Rules are flexible enough to be inter-
preted consistently with them.
Is there a Need for Regulatory Action?
Many of the practices summarized in this Article have already been the subject
of detailed scholarly analyses of the ethical quandaries they raise, including those
arising from mediation,72 collaborative law, 73 community lawyering, 74 and holistic
lawyering. 75 These analyses make detailed observations and proposals about these
specific processes and trends that need not be repeated here.
Without delving into such specificity, it is worth noting that the Model Rules-
a set of Rules informed by, as noted above, traditional notions of practice 76 -have
flexibility to accommodate, at a broad level, new trends in what it means to prac-
tice law. There is reason to believe that whatever the ultimate resolution of debates
71. Id. This argument is actually somewhat puzzling on its own terms because it is not entirely
clear why, even if this were the case, a client's participation in a collaborative law process would be
impaired by another client, a "third person" or the lawyer's "personal interest" so as to constitute
a concurrent conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a)(2).
72. There is a particularly extensive literature on the subject of mediation and legal ethics. Car-
rie Menkel-Meadow has, in particular, been a vocal and influential commentator in this regard. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many "Cs" of Profes-
sional Responsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 979 (2001). See also Loretta W.
Moore, Lawyer Mediators: Meeting the Ethical Challenges, 30 FAM. L. Q. 679 (1996).
73. Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative Law, 21 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 73 (2005); Larry R. Spain, Collaborative Law: A Critical Reflection on Whether a
Collaborative Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporated into the Practice of Law, 56 BAYLOR L.
REV. 141 (2004); John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315 (2003).
74. Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L.
REV. 147 (2000).
75. Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services Provision Through Multidisciplinary Practice-
Encouraging Holistic Advocacy while Protecting Ethical Interests, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 787 (2002);
J. Michael Norwood & Alan Paterson, Problem-Solving in a Multidisciplinary Environment? Must
Ethics Get in the Way of Holistic Services, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 337 (2002).
76. See supra text accompanying note 47.
JOURNAL OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER
surrounding, for example, MDP7 and mandatory counseling about ADR,78 exist-
ing rules may, in some instances, accommodate new practices. At the same time,
existing trends at a more formal level-preeminently the adoption of Rules 2.4 and
5.7-suggest that amendments facilitating new trends will continue as new prac-
tices become more pervasive and acceptable to larger segments of the profession.79
The analysis presented in this Article suggests that the profession will inter-
pret its current regulations, when it can, in line with emerging practices, and that
the profession will, albeit incrementally and when necessary, amend the Rules to
permit them. The regulatory framework of the profession either has or will, sooner
or later, reflect current practices, especially in a profession that continues a long
and proud tradition of self-regulation.8"
In this regard, it is worth noting a striking example of how longstanding pro-
fessional norms, heretofore resistant to change, are finally subject to reform. The
case method-the core law school pedagogy since Christopher Columbus Lang-
dell became the Dean of Harvard Law School in the 1870s 81-is in the process of
substantial revision by, once again, Harvard Law School. Harvard is introducing
a new required course on problem-solving-a change reflecting, in the words of
the current Harvard Dean Elena Kagan, that "the world of law has changed" and
that law school must reflect "changes in what our students will do and what they
need to know."82 These changes have been influential and will likely be a model
that other law schools will follow.83 While the Harvard changes reflect calls for
reform in legal education that became particularly visible with the issuance of the
MacCrate Report in 1992,84 one crucial aspect of legal education that has resisted
change for over 130 years has, at long last, begun to change. Moreover, as with
the Model Rules discussed above, existing regulations governing legal education,
77. See supra text accompanying note 1.
78. See supra text accompanying note 67.
79. For one example of a new proposed Model Rule to facilitate collaborative law, see Fair-
man, supra note 73.
80. For a statement of self-regulation and its justifications, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT, Preamble, cmts. [10]-[12].
81. Edward Rubin, What's Wrong With Langdell's Method and What To Do About It, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 609, 617 (2007).
82. Jonathan D. Glater, Harvard Law Decides to Steep Students in 21st-Century Issues, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006.
83. See also Jonathan D. Glater, Training Law Students for Real-Life Careers, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 31, 2007. Glater notes that the Harvard changes have "galvanized reflection at many law schools."
84. ABA, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CON-
TINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE
GAP (1992). Very recent studies have further amplified the message of the MacCrate Report. Roy
Stuckey and Others, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007); William M. Sullivan et al.,
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007).
85. This is not to suggest that these changes necessarily reflect the trends described in this
Article, although, plainly, "problem-solving" has connections with the shifting nature of the under-
standing of what needs to be addressed in solving client's problems.
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such as the ABA Accreditation Standards,86 embody traditional norms yet do not
stand in the way of changes that reflect new norms and practices."
Conclusion
While the norms of the legal profession remain very much intact, changes are
in the air. These changes are spreading even as the profession continues to segment
and specialize. Increasing numbers of lawyers view practice couched in "narrow
legal terms"88 as no longer capturing the nature of the professional services they
provide.
The Model Rules represent traditional norms yet, inevitably, must reflect the re-
alities of the profession they seek to regulate. While there is necessarily a lag before
realities catch up with formalized norms, the process is inevitable. And, in this case,
inevitability is a good thing as the profession continues to reinvent what it means to
practice law.
86. ABA SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 2007-2008 STAN-
DARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, available at http://www.abanet.org/egaled/standards/stan
dards.html (last visited February 29, 2008).
87. In a comparable development, the National Conference of Bar Examiners-a body that
undertakes another practice resistant to reform-added a "Multistate Performance Test" in 1997.
The MPT seeks to assess applicants' ability to do some of the things that lawyers actually do in prac-
tice: examine case files and investigate facts. http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpt/ (last visited
February 29, 2008).
88. See text accompanying note 50.
